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Abstract
In this paper, we seek to determine if auctions can be used to select players
according to their level-k types. To do so, we embed auctions into the p-
beauty contest game. We find that by using different designs, we can get
the auction winners to be either the lower level-k types or the higher level-k
types. In particular, when the value of winning the auction is increasing in
the level-k types of all the players, higher level-k players bid higher. When
the value of winning the auction is decreasing in the level-k types of all the
players, the lower level-k players bid higher. Taken together, our experiment
confirms thatwe can use auctions to select players by their level-k types. This
shows that auctions can allow an economic designer to affect the outcome of
a game through the selection of level-k types entering to play the game.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The level-k model (e.g., Costa-Gomes et al., 2001; Nagel, 1995; Stahl and Wilson,
1994, 1995) is often used to explain anomalous behaviour in strategic interactions.
The model posits that people can be partitioned into Lk types, where k ∈ ,
and anchors upon a nonstrategic L0 type who is often assumed to uniformly
randomise over all strategies. The other Lk types (k > 0) believe that their
opponents are Lk−1 types and best respond to such beliefs through iterative
thought experiments.1 See Crawford et al. (2013) for an extensive survey of the
literature.2
The level-kmodel attributes aggregatedoutcomes in a game to thedistribution
of level-k types. This implies that an economic designer (e.g., regulators, policy-
makers) may be able to directly influence the outcomes through the selection
of level-k types. Clearly, such selection is trivial when the designer observes
everyone’s type. What happens if he does not?3
In principle, the designer may infer players’ level-k type from their decisions
in previous games. However, Georganas et al. (2015) find that level-k types may
not be stable across different games. There is a growing body of literature that
finds people’s cognitive abilities are correlated to level-k types (e.g., Brañas-Garza
et al., 2012; Burnham et al., 2009; Carpenter et al., 2013; Gill and Prowse, 2016).
In applications, cognitive abilities are indirectly measured through psychological
tests such as the Raven’s IQ test or the cognitive reflective test (Frederick, 2005).
This however means that the reliability of the selection will also depend on
whether the test can be ‘gamed’ or learned.4 Finally, the designer may select
people into a game by their previous decisions in that game. However, such a
process could be costly (i.e, the designer has to first run the game with a larger
1Aclose variant of the level-kmodel is the cognitive hierarchy (Camerer et al., 2004)modelwhere
Lk (k > 0) types belief that others are mixture of lower types. There is also the noisy introspection
(Goeree and Holt, 2004) model that uses the level-k structure but assumes that players best
respond to the noisy best response of others.
2Variants of the level-k model have been used to explain behaviour in the p-beauty contest
game (e.g., Nagel, 1995; Camerer et al., 2004), normal-form games (e.g., Stahl and Wilson, 1994,
1995; Costa-Gomes et al., 2001), auctions (e.g., Crawford and Iriberri, 2007; Georganas, 2011) and
the centipede game (Kawagoe and Takizawa, 2012). More recently, the model is also used to
explain betting behaviour (Östling et al., 2011) and the ‘cold releases’ of movies (Brown et al.,
2012).
3In some circumstances, the designer might know the distribution of types in the population.
This can inform the designer as to the prior probability of a randomly selected player being a spe-
cific type. This study examines whether a purposeful selection mechanism can give the designer
a more accurate posterior of a selected player’s type over the random selection mechanism.
4For example, Haigh (2016) find that performances in the cognitive reflective test strongly
depend on whether subject have heard of the test.
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group to find a subgroup of players). Also, since the game would need to be
played twice, players’ decisions could be influenced by learning from the initial
game. In addition, the players’ knowledge that the decisions in the game will
affect their subsequent participation may lead to them strategically altering their
behaviour in the initial game and their beliefs about others (potentially in an
unknown way).
This paper proposes a more ‘direct approach’, using auctions to select people
by their level-k types.5 The idea is as follows. Suppose that the designer has
some understanding as to how the different level-k types will behave in the
game, he could design incentives such that the different types will have different
willingness to pay to participate in the game. When auctions are used to allocate
the participation rights to the game, the rights will be purchased by those with
the highest willingness to pay. This willingness to pay will be ‘calibrated’ to be
highest for the desired level-k type.
To test the idea that auctions can select people by their level-k types, we design
an experiment where auctions are used to allocate the participation rights to the
p-beauty contest game (Nagel, 1995).6 The game involves n ≥ 2 players who each
choose a number between 0 and 100 (both limits included). The player whose
chosen number is closest to p  2/3 times the average of all numbers wins a fixed
prize.7 The equilibrium is for all players to choose 0. However, this is seldom
observed in practice. Instead, people often choose numbers around 50p and 50p2
(see Nagel, 1995; Bosch-Domènech et al., 2002) which correspond to the predicted
choices of the L1 and L2 types, respectively.8
Two treatments, the AVG and AVGINV treatments, are considered in our
design. Each experimental session uses the 9th price auction to allocate 8 tickets
– there are 24 bidders in each sessions.9 A player can only purchase one ticket.
5We are aware that previous studies by Crawford and Iriberri (2007) and Georganas (2011)
have attempted to use the level-k model to explain bidding behaviour in auctions. However, to
the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to investigate whether auctions can select people
by their level-k type.
6We do not claim that the p-beauty contest gamemay be the best game for the purposes of this
study or that it is informative as to real world economic interactions. Instead, we use it because
of the robust evidence that deviation from equilibrium in the game follow a coherent pattern that
can be explained by the level-k model.
7In the case of a tie (i.e., more than one claimants) the prize is equally split amongst all
claimants.
8When n > 2, a player may deviate from the equilibrium if he believes that others who do so.
To address this, Grosskopf and Nagel (2008) consider the n  2 version of the p-beauty contest
game, where it is a weakly dominant strategy to choose 0. They find that chosen numbers in the
n  2 version are no different from those in the n  4 version.
9We use the 9th price auction to allocate 8 tickets as bidding one’s valuation is the weakly
dominant strategy. This limits the strategical interplay that may arise with other auction formats.
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Ownership of a ticket gives the player (a) the rights to play the n  8 player p-
beauty contest game and (b) an uncertain bonus payment – the bonus is separate
from the p-beauty contest game prize. The two treatments only differ on how the
bonus is determined. Applying the level-k model into this framework, we show
that players’ willingness to pay (for a ticket) in the AVG and AVGINV treatments
will be decreasing and increasing, respectively, with their Lk types (k > 0). Given
a fixed distribution of Lk types, auctions in the AVG andAVGINV treatments will
hence select (allocate tickets to) the higher and lowerLk (k > 0) types, respectively,
to participate in the p-beauty contest game. The model therefore predicts that:
• Auctions in the AVG treatment will select lower level-k types into the p-
beauty contest game.
• Auctions in the AVGINV treatment will select higher level-k types into the
p-beauty contest game.
Experimental data is often noisy and it is difficult to directly infer subjects’ Lk
type from their decisions in the p-beauty contest game. We hence use a novel
approach to assign each experimental subject a Lk type.10 To do so, we required
subjects in both treatments play the p-contest game twice without feedback. In
the first attempt, subjects played the standardn  8 playerp-beauty contest game.
In the second attempt, subjects played the n  8 player p-beauty contest game
with the auction mechanism. We also use the strategy method (Selten, 1967) in the
second attempt, subjects submitted their bids and also the p-beauty contest game
number to be used if theywere allocated a ticket. Based on their choices over both
attempts, we devise a procedure to assign subjects a Lk type. Furthermore, by
comparing subjects’ choices in the second attempt betweenAVG andAVGINV,we
can also shed light on the question as to whether the type of auction mechanism
influences their behaviour in the p-beauty contest game.
Our results are summarised as follows. Firstly, we find that the type of auction
mechanism has no significant influence on subjects’ behaviour in the p-beauty
contest game. Secondly, we find that auctions in theAVG treatment select subjects
who are assigned lower Lk types. Thirdly, we find that auctions in the AVGINV
treatment select subjects who are assigned higher Lk types. Taken together, these
10Prior studies (e.g., Costa-Gomes et al., 2001; Costa-Gomes and Crawford, 2006) have used
mixture models to estimate subjects’ Lk type. This approach typically requires subjects to re-
peatedly play different variations of the same game in order to detect coherent patterns in their
decision-making process. However, repeated play in the p-beauty contest game often results in
behaviour converging towards the equilibrium (e.g., Nagel, 1995; Duffy and Nagel, 1997; Gill and
Prowse, 2016) even when subjects receive no feedback (see Weber, 2003).
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findings show that auctions can indeed be used to select people by their level-k
types.
This study also adds to the growing literature that investigates the influence
of markets on strategic interactions. For example, prior experiments find that
auctioningparticipation rights can improve efficiency in coordination games (e.g.,
Huyck et al., 1993; Crawford and Broseta, 1998), increase contributions in public
goods games (Broseta et al., 2007), increase the prospects of collusion in oligopoly
markets (Offerman and Potters, 2006) and affect behaviour in the ultimatumgame
(Shachat and Swarthout, 2013). On this issue, we find that auction markets in
the p-beauty contest game (AVGINV treatment) can be used to drive behaviour
closer to the equilibrium prediction.
The rest of this paper is structured as followed. Section 2 details our experi-
ment design, Section 3 details our results and Section 4 concludes.
2. EXPERIMENT DESIGN
TheAVG (3 sessions, 72 subjects) andAVGINV (3 sessions, 72 subjects) treatments
were conducted in May 2018 with student subjects at the Shanghai Jiao Tong
University (SUJT) Smith Experimental Economics ResearchCenter. Subjectswere
recruited through ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) and the experiment was programmed
with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Payoffs in the experiment were denoted in points
and exchange into cash at the rate of one point to 0.45 RMB– subjects also received
a 10 RMB show-up payment. Each session took about 60 minutes and the mean
cash earning was approximately 60 RMB (8.72 USD).
In the following, we will first detail the AVG and AVGINV treatments. There-
after, we will introduce the level-k model’s predictions and our test hypotheses.
2.1. THE AVG AND AVGINV TREATMENTS
Each session in the AVG and AVGINV treatments involves 24 subjects who make
decisions over two stages. The instructions for stage 2 are only distributed at the
end of stage 1. Subjects also receive no feedback in between both stages.
• Stage 1: The 24 subjects are randomly matched into three groups. Each
subject submits a number (up to two decimal places) to the n  8 player
p-beauty contest game for a winning prize of 15 points – there is one prize
per group.
4
• Stage 2: The 24 subjects are each endowed with 100 points. We use the 9th
price auction mechanism to allocate 8 tickets. Each ticket gives the owner:
(a) the rights to again play the n  8 player p-beauty contest game for a
winning price of 15 points (i.e., ticket owners will play against other
ticket owners),11
and
(b) an uncertain common bonus payment of X ∈ [0, 100] – to be detailed
in the later paragraph.12
We use the strategy method in stage 2. Subjects submit their bids (between
0 and 100) and their numbers to p-beauty contest game if they purchased a
ticket.
For the ease of exposition, we will refer to subjects’ p-beauty contest game
number in stages 1 and 2 as the BCG1 and BCG2 numbers, respectively. Also, we
refer to auctionwinners and losers as subjectswho are successful andunsuccessful,
respectively, at purchasing a ticket.
In each session, define X¯ as the average BCG1 number of 8 random subjects.
The bonus in the AVG and AVGINV treatment sessions are computed as:
XAVG  X¯,
XAVGINV  100 − X¯.
As such, the treatments only differ on how the bonus is computed. We also
elicited subjects’ beliefs about the bonus payment: subjects submitted a number
between 0 and 100, and received 10 points if the bonus was within 3 integers of
their number. At the end of the experiment, subjects received full feedback as to
their decisions in stages 1 and 2. Before receiving their cash payments, they also
performed the three question cognitive reflect test (Frederick, 2005) and the Holt
and Laury (2002) risk preference elicitation task.
Remarks: We choose to base the bonus on the BCG1 number as it seems the
easiest for subjects to comprehend. It is also possible to base the bonus on the
BCG2 numbers of auction winners. However, doing so for each auction winner
11Unlike stage 1, there is only one p-beauty contest game prize to be awarded amongst the 24
subjects.
12The auction here has a common-value flavour given that bonus payment is identical for all
ticket holders. However, players’ expectations about the bonus will depend on their Lk types.
Since each Lk (k > 0) type does not allow for his beliefs to be incorrect, we believe that the auction
is more closely aligned to the independent private-value setup.
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would require the bonus to depend on the average number of the other seven
auction winners – the bonus might be different for all auction winners.13, 14
2.2. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
The equilibrium is for the BCG1 and BCG2 numbers to be zero. Risk-neutral
players in the AVG and AVGINV treatments will value the tickets at 15/8 and
100 + (15/8), respectively, and the tickets are randomly sold at the respective
prices.15
In the following, we assume that the L0 type uniformly randomises over all
numbers in p-beauty contest game and bids randomly in the auction. Further-
more, assume that all players are risk neutral and the auction mechanism does
not influence the Lk (k > 0) types’ beliefs about their opponents’ types. As such,
a Lk (k > 0) number will submit the same BCG1 and BCG2 numbers – only the
L0 types can submit different numbers.
In the p-beauty contest game, a L1 type believes that everyone else is a L0 who
uniformly randomises. He thus expects the average to be 50 (mean of the uniform
distribution) and chooses 50p to minimise the distance between his number and
p times his expected average – he neglects the influence of his own number on the
average. A L2 type believes that everyone else is a L1 type who chooses 50p. From
the above logic, the L2 type best respond to such beliefs by choosing 50p2. More
generally, a Lk type believes the average to be 50pk−1 and thus chooses 50pk.
Let vk denote a Lk (k > 0) type’s valuation of a ticket in stage 2,
vkAVG 
(A)︷ ︸︸ ︷
50pk−1 +
(B)︷︸︸︷
15m
vkAVGINV  (100 − 50p
k−1)︸            ︷︷            ︸
(A)
+ 15m︸︷︷︸
(B)
where the component (A) is his expected bonus amount and the component (B)
13If the bonus only depended on the average BCG2 number of auction winners, then each
subject in the AVG and AVGINV treatments has the strategic incentive to choose 100 and 0,
respectively, as their BCG2 numbers in order to maximise their bonus payment.
14Such a more complicated design was used in Kaplan and Ruﬄe (2004) to test whether there
was a self-serving bias where onemay guess higher in the AVG if one’s payment was higher when
the other guessed higher.
15If the BCG1 and BCG2 numbers are zero for all players, then the expected bonus in the AVG
andAVGINV treatments are 0 and 100, respectively. As such, a risk-neutral player will in the AVG
and AVGINV treatments will value each ticket at 15/8 and 100+ (15/8) points, respectively – each
ticket owner has an equal chance of winning the prize in stage 2. However, bids are bounded
between 0 and 100.
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is his expected cashflow from playing the p-beauty contest game if he purchased
a ticket – here m ∈ [0, 1] denotes the subjective probability of winning the prize
and is assumed to be constant (does not vary with Lk type or treatment).
Given that eachLk (k > 0) type believes that all other player are typeLk−1, even
though there is a common value to winning the auction, it is a weakly dominant
strategy for him to bid his valuation.16 As such, bids for Lk (k > 0) types in
the AVG and AVGINV treatments are decreasing and increasing, respectively,
with k. Finally, since choices in the p-beauty contest game are expected to be
decreasing with k, the correlation of p-beauty contest game choices and bids will
be positive and negative for Lk (k > 0) types in the AVG andAVGINV treatments,
respectively. In contrast, bids and p-beauty contest choices are independent for
L0 types in both treatments.
The level-kmodel thereforepredicts that auctions are able to select (i.e., allocate
tickets to) people by their level-k types. For a fixed population of Lk types,
• Auctions in the AVG treatment will select the lower Lk (k > 0) types.
• Auctions in the AVGINV treatment will select the higher Lk (k > 0) types.
We remain nonchalant about the selection of L0 types since they are assumed to
bid randomly.
Comment. Given the above, each Lk (k > 0) always expects to win the
auction in the AVGINV treatment. In contrast, the L2 and higher types in the
AVG treatment never expect to win the auction – the L1 type may assign some
chance of winning the auction since the L0 type bids randomly. However, L2
and above types in the AVGINV treatment may entertain the possibility that they
overestimated the Lk types of the other players – this does not affect the L1 type
who believes that everyone else if a L0 type. We assume that Lk types never
underestimate the types of other players (i.e., they always think that they are
the highest type in the population). Since in the AVGINV treatment, the players
expect towin the auction and the bonusmight be lower since it is inversely related
to the BCG1 numbers of 8 random players, the L2 and higher types may shade
their bids, that is, bid less than their valuation. In contrast, in the AVG treatment,
we expect entertaining the possibility of overestimating types to have limited
16A simplified version of our auction design in the 2nd price private-value auction. Crawford
and Iriberri (2007) use the level-k model to explain bidding behaviour in auctions. Their model
anchors upon two different L0 types, one that bids randomly (random L0) and one that bids
truthfully (truthful L0). This leads to the truthful and random L1 types who best respond to a
truthful and random L0 types, respectively, as well as the truthful and random L2 types who who
best respond to a truthful and random L1 type, respectively. The authors show that in a 2nd price
auction, it is still a weakly dominant strategy for higher L1 and L2 types to bid their valuation.
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influence on the bidding behaviours of L2 and higher types in the AVG treatment
since they do not expect to win the auction. Importantly, the above discussions
suggest that even with two identical populations of players, it is possible for bids
to be different from 100 minus the bids in the AVGINV treatment.17 In particular,
the latter can be expected to be higher.
2.3. HYPOTHESES
We do not perfectly observe subjects’ Lk types. However, the level-k model
predicts that choices in the p-beauty contest games are decreasing with subjects’
Lk type. This leads us to the following within-treatment and between-treatment
test hypotheses:
H1a : (within-treatment). BCG1 and BCG2 numbers in the AVG treatment are higher
for auction winners relative to auction losers.
H2a : (within-treatment). BCG1 and BCG2 numbers in the AVGINV treatment are
lower for auction winners relative to auction losers.
H3a : (between-treatment). Auction winners’ BCG1 and BCG2 numbers are higher in
AVG treatment relative to the AVGINV treatment.
H4a : (between-treatment). Auction losers’ BCG1 and BCG2 numbers are lower in
AVG treatment relative to AVGINV treatment.
Building on the hypotheses H1a-H4a, we introduce a procedure to assign each
subject a Lk type based on their BCG1 and BCG2 numbers – we discuss the
procedure later. Based on this assignment procedure the corresponding within-
treatment and between-treatment test hypotheses are:
H1b : (within-treatment). The Lk (k > 0) types in the AVG treatment are lower for
auction winners relative to auction losers.
H2b : (within-treatment). The Lk (k > 0) types in the AVGINV treatment are higher
for auction winners relative to auction losers.
H3b : (between-treatment). The Lk (k > 0) types for auction winners are lower in the
AVG treatment relative to the AVGINV treatment.
H4b : (between-treatment). The Lk (k > 0) types for auction losers are higher in the
AVG treatment relative to the AVGINV treatment.
17If the population of players are identical and players always bid their valuation, a Lk (k > 0)
type’s bid in the AVG treatment will be identical to 100 minus the same type’s bid in the AVGINV
treatment.
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3. RESULTS
3.1. PRELIMINARIES
We do not find any significant between-treatment differences in BCG1 numbers
(Mann-Whitney (MW), P  0.61), cognitive reflective test performances (MW,
P  0.67) and elicited risk preferences (MW, P  0.48).18, 19
As an empirical warmup, we first investigate whether the auction mechanism
affects subjects’ behaviour in the p-beauty contest game. One possibility is that
the players foresee that the auction mechanism selects different types of players
and adjust their behaviour accordingly. If so, we can expect BCG2 numbers
to differ in the AVG and AVGINV treatments. However, we find no significant
between treatment differences in BCG2 numbers (MW, P  0.36).
An alternative possibility is that participating in auctions lead to subjects
submitting different numbers in the first and second p-beauty contest games
through affecting their thought processes. Subjects may also ‘learn’ about the
equilibrium through repeated play even when they receive no feedback (see
Weber, 2003). Indeed, we often find subjects’ BCG2 numbers to be slightly lower
than their BCG1 numbers. However, the differences are not significant in the
AVG (Wilcoxon Signed-rank (WSR), P  0.09) and the AVGINV (WSR, P  0.22)
treatments. Furthermore, the nominal differences in BCG1 and BCG2 numbers
are no more than five for 58% and 61% of subjects in the AVG and AVGINV
treatments, respectively.
We test whether there is any coherent differences in how AVG and AVGINV
treatment subjects behave over the first and second p-beauty contest games – this
builds on the logic that both treatments offer contrasting predictions as to the
selection of Lk types.20 We define ∆ as subjects’ BCG1 number minus their BCG2
number.21 Between-treatment comparison finds no significant differences in ∆
(MW, P  0.67).
18Three sessions were conducted for each treatment. We also find no significant between-
sessions differences in BCG1 and BCG2 numbers for the AVG (Kruskal-Wallis, P ≥ 0.27) and
AVGINV (Kruskal-Wallis, P ≥ 0.09 treatments).
19We do not find any significant correlations between BCG1 or BCG2 numbers with subjects’
performances in the cognitive reflective test nor their risk preferences.
20Kaplan and Ruﬄe (2004) provide one possibility as to how the bonus computation can affect
behaviour. Subjects in the AVG treatment might expect the tickets to be purchased by those other
subjects who believe the average BCG1 number to be high and consequently submit a high BCG2
number. As such, subjects in the AVG treatment would submit a higher BCG2 number than their
BCG1 number. By the same logic, subjects in the AVGINV treatment would submit a lower BCG2
number than their BCG1 number.
21Anegative (resp. positive)∆ implies that the subject’s BCG2 (resp. BCG1) number is relatively
higher.
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The above observations suggest that the auction selection mechanism has no
significant influence on subjects’ behaviour in the p-beauty contest game.22 The
discussions henceforth will mainly focus on the BCG2 numbers. The summary
statistics of the above observations are reported in the Appendix.
3.2. AUCTIONS AND P-BEAUTY CONTEST NUMBERS
Figure 1 details the scatter plot of bids and BCG2 numbers for subjects in the AVG
and AVGINV treatments.23 We observe bids and BCG2 numbers to be positively
(Spearman ρ  0.47, P < 0.01) and negatively (Spearman ρ  −0.42, P < 0.01)
correlated for subjects in the AVG and AVGINV treatments.
Figure 2 details the Boxplot distribution of BCG2 numbers for auctionwinners
and losers in the AVG and AVGINV treatments. Within-treatment comparisons
find BCG2 numbers to be significantly higher (MW, P < 0.01) for auction winners
relative to losers in the AVG treatment. In contrast, BCG2 numbers are signifi-
cantly lower (MW, P < 0.01) for auction winners relative to losers in the AVGINV
treatment. Turning our attention to the between-treatment differences, we find
auction winners’ BCG2 numbers to be significantly lower (MW, P < 0.01) in
the AVG treatment relative to AVGINV treatment. Finally, we find auction losers’
BCG2numbers to be significantly higher (MW, P < 0.01) in theAVG treatment rel-
ative to AVGINV treatment. The above within-treatment and between-treatment
comparisons also hold (at the 1% significance level) when the BCG1 numbers are
considered.24 This leads us to the following result.
22Perhaps higher types are more capable in anticipating that the auction will affect the selection
of types entering the game – they adjust their BCG2numbers to reflect this. In particular, the BCG2
numbers of higher typeswill be lower in theAVGINV relative to theAVG treatment. To study this,
we only focus on subjects whose BCG1 numbers were at most 50p2, that is, the level-k model’s
prediction for the L2 types and above. We find no significant between-treatment differences for
the BCG2 numbers of these subjects (MW, P  0.08) – mean AVG and AVGINV BCG2 numbers
for these subjects are 17.54 (n  21) and 22.49 (n  20), respectively. If anything, BCG2 numbers
are instead higher in the AVGINV relative to AVG treatment, which is contradictory to the idea
that higher types anticipate the selection outcome.
23We do not find any significant between-session differences in bids for the AVG (Kruskal-
Wallis, P  0.50) and AVGINV (Kruskal-Wallis, P  0.36) treatments. The auction transaction
prices (i.e., the 9th highest bid price) in the three AVG treatment sessions are 37, 38 and 40. The
corresponding prices in the three AVGINV treatment sessions are 60, 60 and 66.
24The correlation of bids and BCG1 numbers in the AVG and AVGINV treatments to be positive
(Spearman ρ  0.53, P < 0.01) and negative (Spearman ρ  −0.23, P  0.04), respectively.
Similarly, between-treatment comparisons find BCG1 numbers to be significantly (MW, P < 0.01)
higher in the AVG treatment for auction winners and significantly lower in the AVG treatment for
auction losers.
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Figure 1.
Scatterplot of bids and BCG2 numbers.
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Figure 2.
Boxplot distribution of BCG2 numbers for auction winners and losers.
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Result 1 (H1a) BCG1 and BCG2 numbers in the AVG treatment are significantly higher
for auction winners relative to auction losers. (H2a) BCG1 and BCG2 numbers in the
AVGINV treatment are significantly lower for auction winners relative to auction losers.
(H3a) BCG1 and BCG2 numbers for auction winners are significantly higher in the
AVG treatment relative to the AVGINV treatment. (H4a) BCG1 and BCG2 numbers
for auction losers are significantly lower in the AVG treatment relative to the AVGINV
treatment.
3.3. AUCTION AND LEVEL-K TYPES
Panel A of Figure 3 details the kernel density estimates of BCG2 numbers in
the AVG and AVGINV treatments – the distributions appear to be bimodal with
the modes around the L1 and L2 types’ predicted choices. When only auction
winners are considered (Panel B of Figure 3), the distribution of BCG2 numbers
in the AVG and AVGINV treatments now seem to be unimodal with the mode
at L1 and L2 types’, respectively, predicted choice. Finally, when only auction
losers are considered (Panel C of Figure 3), the AVG treatment’s distribution
seems unimodal with the mode at the L2 types’ predicted choice. In contrast, the
AVGINV treatment’s distribution is bimodal with the modes at L1 and L2 types’
predicted choices.
The following details our strategy to infer subjects’ Lk types from their BCG1
and BCG2 numbers.25 The approach is based on the idea that whilst each Lk
(k > 0) typemight pick slightly different BCG1andBCG2numbers, both numbers
will be close to the same predicted Lk type number – no such coherent behaviour
is expected for the L0 type.
3.3.1. How we assign level-k types
For each subject, let cj be his p-beauty contest game number in stage j  1, 2 and
compute αj
k
 |cj − 50pk | for k  1, 2, ...,K.26 Here, α1
k
(resp. α2
k
) is the absolute
distance of the subject’s BCG1 (resp. BCG2) number from the Lk (k > 0) type’s
predicted choice. Given the above, we derive the set Sj  {αj1,α
j
2, ..,α
j
K
} for each
subject. Denote sj  min Sj as the smallest element in set Sj.27 Let θj be a subject’s
25We have too few observations per subject to reliably estimate the type of each subject. We are
hesitant to increase the number of p-beauty contest game played by each subject as this would
complicate the auction design. Furthermore, increasing the number of games played may induce
large learning effects – we would have need to specify a learning model.
26The level-kmodel does not impose a limit on the highest possible type. In such cases, it is also
possible for behaviour to converge to the equilibrium as Lk types goes to infinity. For practical
purposes, researchers often impose an arbitrary ‘highest’ type K.
27In all our discussions, the variable sj is always observed to be unique.
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Figure 3.
Kernel density estimates of BCG2 numbers.
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pseudo-type in stage j:
θj 


1
2
...
K
K + 1
0
if sj  α
j
1
and sj ≤ e,
if sj  α
j
2 and s
j ≤ e,
...
if sj  α
j
K
and sj ≤ e,
if cj < 50pK − e,
if otherwise,
where e > 0 is some tolerance level. A subject is therefore classiﬁed as pseudo-
type θj  k type in stage j if cj is closest to 50pk and |cj − 50pk | ≤ e or otherwise
θj  0. For a ﬁnite K, we simply cluster subjects’ whose cj is lower than 50pK − e
as pseudo-type K+ 1. Given the above, a subject is assigned to be type Lˆk (k > 0)
if θ1  θ2  k or otherwise Lˆ0. In this case, a type Lˆ0 subject is one whose
θ1  θ2  0 or θ1 , θ2.28
28Suppose that c1  30 and c2  28. This subject will be assigned to be type Lˆ1 if e  6 and Lˆ0 if
e  4.
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The above approach is sufficient to assign the types for most subjects. How-
ever, it is plausible for subjects to ‘learn’ in the p-beauty contest game even when
there is no feedback.29 To allow for such learning, we apply a correction to our
assignment of types. We reassign subjects type from Lˆ0 to Lˆg, where g  θ2, if
θ2 − θ1  1 (i.e., we assume that subjects can only perform a one step jump in Lk
type).
How meaningful is our assignment of types? To shed light on this question,
it is useful to return the model in Section 2.2. The model predicts that bids and
BCG2 numbers are independent for the L0 type. In contrast, bids and BGC2
numbers are positively and negatively correlated for Lk (k > 0) types in the
AVG and AVGINV treatments, respectively. Also the model predicts that Lk
(k > 0) types in AVG and AVGINV treatments expect the bonus amount to be
(Xk)  50pk−1 and (Xk)  100 − 50pk−1, respectively. We hence compare the
(Xk) against (XB), subjects’ elicited beliefs about the bonus amount, for Lk
(k > 0) types.30
3.3.2. Assignment of level-k types
Panel A of Table 1 details the proportion of Lˆk types for K  3 and e  0, 2.5, 5,
7.5 and 10 – we also report the number of corrections performed.31 Whilst we
do not observe any significant between-treatment differences in the distribution
of assigned types (Fisher exact, P ≥ 0.35), the table demonstrates the tradeoffs
with the choice of e. More specifically, decreasing e increases the precision of the
assignment procedures (i.e., subjects have to choose closer to predicted Lk (k > 0)
types’ choice to be assigned as Lˆk type). However, decreasing e also increases the
biases towards the Lˆ0 type (i.e., a greater proportion of subjects may be wrongly
assigned as Lˆ0 type).
Panel B of Table 1 reports the Spearman correlation of bids and BCG2 numbers
for Lˆ0 and Lˆ1-Lˆ4 types.32 When e ≥ 5/2, we observe bids and BGC2 numbers to be
positively and negatively correlated (significant at the 1% level) for higher types
in the AVG and AVGINV treatments. For Lˆ0 types, we only fail to reject (10%
level) the null hypothesis of independence between bids and BCG2 numbers
29For example, a subject might behave like a L1 type in the first stage and a L2 type in the second
stage.
30Recall that subjects submit their beliefs about the amount and receive a payoff of 10 points if
their beliefs are within 3 integers of the realised bonus amount.
31We fix K  3 as the distance between the Lk predicted choices above this threshold becomes
incrementally small. In this case, all subjects whose cj is less than 50p3 − e will be assigned the
pseudo-type θj  4.
32The correlation of bids and BCG1 numbers yield similar conclusions.
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Table 1.
Summary statistics of assigned Lˆk types for all subjects.
e  0 e  2.5 e  5 e  7.5 e  10
Treatment AVG AVGINV AVG AVGINV AVG AVGINV AVG AVGINV AVG AVGINV
♯ of correction 0 0 10 5 10 4 9 5 9 6
PANEL A: Proportion of Lˆk types
Lˆ0 0.90 0.94 0.61 0.60 0.32 0.42 0.26 0.38 0.22 0.36
Lˆ1 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.21 0.28 0.22 0.31 0.26 0.33 0.28
Lˆ2 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.10 0.22 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Lˆ3 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.06 0.13 0.07 0.13 0.08 0.15 0.08
Lˆ4 0.10 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.03
Fisher Exact P: P  0.532 P  0.787 P  0.602 P  0.591 P  0.350
Panel B: Correlation of Bids and BCG2 number (Spearman ρ)
Lˆ0 type: 0.34
a -0.35a 0.14 -0.30b 0.10 -0.25 0.16 -0.28 0.04 -0.28
Lˆ1 − Lˆ4 types: -0.35 0.23 0.73
a -0.64a 0.68a -0.59a 0.60a -0.52a 0.61a −0.50a
Panel C: Proportion of Lˆ1-Lˆ4 types whose
|(XE) −(XA)|  0 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04
|(XB) −(Xk)| ≤ e 0.71 0.25 0.50 0.35 0.41 0.48 0.43 0.49 0.40 0.50
♯ of subjects 7 4 28 29 49 42 53 45 56 46
Note. a and b denote P < 0.01 and P < 0.05, respectively.
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Table 2.
Proportion of types Lˆ1-Lˆ4 for auction winners and losers.
e  0 e  5/2 e  5 e  15/2 e  10
(A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B)
PANEL A: Auction winners
Lˆ1 0.00 0.00 0.82 0.22 0.80 0.14 0.76 0.20 0.79 0.20
Lˆ2 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.11 0.20 0.36 0.24 0.33 0.21 0.33
Lˆ3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.33
Lˆ4 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.14
n 0 4 11 9 15 14 17 15 19 15
FE NA P  0.001a P  0.001a P  0.001a P  0.001a
PANEL B: Auction losers
Lˆ1 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.65 0.24 0.50 0.25 0.53 0.24 0.55
Lˆ2 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.30 0.38 0.46 0.39 0.43 0.38 0.42
Lˆ3 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.05 0.26 0.04 0.25 0.03 0.30 0.03
Lˆ4 1.00 0.00 0.35 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.08 0.00
n 7 0 17 20 34 28 36 30 37 31
FE: NA P  0.005a P  0.007a P  0.006a P  0.002a
Note. (A) = AVG and (B) = AVGINV. We also report the Fisher exact (FE) p-value for
between-treatment comparison of types.
a and b denote P < 0.01 and P < 0.05, respectively.
when e ≥ 5.33 Panel C of Table 1 details the proportion of Lˆ1-Lˆ4 types whose
|(XB)−(Xk)|  0 and |(XB)−(Xk)| ≤ e. We note that the absolute diﬀerence
are no more than the tolerance level e for around 40% of Lˆk (k > 0) types
when e ≥ 5. The above observations suggest that our assignment procedures
may capture meaningful properties that are consistent with the level-k model in
Section 2.2.
Panels A and B of Table 2 detail the observed proportions of Lˆ1-Lˆ4 types
who are auction winners and losers, respectively, in the AVG and AVGINV treat-
ments.34
Within-treatment comparisons (e ≥ 5/2) ﬁnd the proportion of Lˆk (k > 0)
types amongst auction winners and losers to be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in the
AVG (Fisher exact, P < 0.01) and AVGINV (Fisher exact, P < 0.01) treatments.
Between-treatment comparisons (e ≥ 5/2) ﬁnds the proportion of Lˆk (k > 0)
33For all e considered, we do not ﬁnd Lˆk types to be signiﬁcantly correlated with cognitive
reﬂective test performances or risk preferences.
34We omit the Lˆ0 to focus our comparisons on the Lk (k > 0) types. For e ≥ 5/2, we nevertheless
ﬁnd no signiﬁcant between-treatment diﬀerences in the proportion of Lˆ0 types amongst auction
winners (Fisher Exact, P ≥ 0.34) and losers (Fisher Exact P ≥ 0.28).
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types in the AVG and AVGINV treatments to be significantly different for auction
winners (Fisher exact, P < 0.01) and losers (Fisher exact, P < 0.01). This leads us
to our third result.
Result 2 (H1b) Lˆk (k > 0) types in theAVG treatment are significantly lower for auction
winners relative to auction losers. (H2b) Lˆk (k > 0) types in the AVGINV treatment
are significantly higher for auction winners relative to auction losers. (H3b) Lˆk (k > 0)
types for auction winners are significantly lower in the AVG treatment relative to the
AVGINV treatment. (H4b) Lˆk (k > 0) types for auction losers are significantly higher
in the AVG treatment relative to the AVGINV treatment.
3.4. THE WINNER’S CURSE?
In common value auctions, the ‘winner’s curse’ is the phenomenon where the
winner of the auction overpays for the object – in equilibrium players avoid the
winner’s curse by shading their bids. In their analysis of second price common
value auctions, Crawford and Iriberri (2007) show that it can be possible for higher
Lk types to be less susceptible to the winner’s curse. This would also be the case
if higher Lk types are more reflective about the causes of a winner’s curse.
Given the above, it is natural to ask if higher types are indeed less susceptible
to the winner’s curse. To study this, we use the fact that auction winner’s Lk
types are higher in the AVGINV treatment relative to the AVG treatment. For
each auction winner, denote pi as the bonus amount received minus the auction
ticket price paid plus the expected value of the p-beauty contest game, which is
15/8. We find that pi < 0 (Signrank P  0.001) and pi > 0 (Signrank P < 0.001)
for auction winners in the AVG and AVGINV treatments, respectively – mean
pi for auction winners in the AVG and AVGINV treatments are -4.54 and 10.02,
respectively. These observations imply that only auction winners in the AVG
treatment suffer from the winner’s curse.
The results insofar indicate that the proportion of Lk types in the AVG and
AVGINV treatments are similar. Do they exhibit similar bidding behaviours?
The comment discussions on section 2.2 suggest that L2 types and above in the
AVGINV treatment may shade their bids more aggressively than those in the
AVG treatment to account for the possibility of the winner’s curse.35 To see this
we compute γ as the subjects’ bids in the AVG treatment. For subjects in the
AVGINV treatment, we compute γ as 100minus their bids. If bidding behaviours
35In the AVGINV treatment, the winner’s curse occurs when the Lk type overestimates the
types of other players and hence overpays for the ticket.
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Figure 4.
Cumulative density function of γ.
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Note. γ is computed as subjects’ bid in the AVG treatment and 100 minus bids in the AVGINV
treatment.
are similar across both treatments,we also expect thedistributionofγ to be similar
across both treatments. Figure 4 details the cumulative density function of γ in
the respective treatments. We ﬁnd γ to be signiﬁcantly higher (MW, P < 0.001) in
the AVGINV treatment relative to the AVG treatment, suggesting that subjects in
the AVGINV treatment may be shading their bids more aggressively than those
in the AVG treatment.
3.5. ROBUSTNESS
Central to Results 1 and 2 is the idea that a ‘purposeful’ auction mechanism is
able to separate subjects by their level-k types. This implies that ‘non purposeful’
auction mechanism should therefore fail to separate subjects by their level-k
types. To test this, we conducted the RAND treatment (2 sessions, 48 subjects)
which diﬀers from the AVG and AVGINV treatments only in that the bonus is
now a random (uniform) variable between 0 and 100.36 As a consequence, the
36Subjects were informed that the bonus X is a random number between 0 and 100.
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auctionmechanismwill no longer be able to select people by their level-k types.37
Between-treatment comparisons does not find BCG1 (Kruskal-Wallis, P 
0.71) and BCG2 (Kruskal-Wallis, P  0.49) numbers in the RAND treatment to
be significantly different to those reported in the AVG and AVGINV treatments.
However, we find no significant correlation in bids and BCG2 numbers (Spear-
man ρ  −0.05, significance P  0.70) for subjects in the RAND treatment.38 As
a consequence, we do not find BCG1 (MW, P  0.81) and BCG2 (MW, P  0.45)
numbers to be significantly different for auction winners and losers in the RAND
treatment. These observations clearly show that a ‘non purposeful’ auctionmech-
anism is unable to select subjects by their level-k types.
4. CONCLUSION
This study investigates whether auctions can select people by their level-k types.
To do so, we embed auctions into the p-beauty contest game. Two treatments
are considered, the AVG and AVGINV treatments. Using the level-k model we
show that auctions should select lower and higher Lk (k > 0) types to play the
p-beauty contest game in the AVG and AVGINV treatments, respectively. Our
findings provide robust evidence inline with this prediction. For robustness, we
also consider a treatment where the auctions not expected to select people by
their level-k types. Again, our experiment provides evidence inline with this
prediction.
Taken together, we find that auctions can indeed select people by their level-
k type. As mentioned in the Introduction, this has important implications for
economic designers since it implies that itmight be possible to influence outcomes
in any game by using auctions to select level-k types. We hope to build on this
findings and extend the research on market selection to our games commonly
associated with the level-k model.
Many economies use markets to allocate decision making tasks (e.g., licenses,
permits, firms). In most case, the elimination of behavioural anomalies in such
task requires higher level-k types. However, our findings suggest that market
competition does not necessary eliminate behavioural anomalies in such task. If
the lower level-k types value the decision making rights more than the higher
level-k types, it is possible that market competition might actually exacerbate
37Whilst the L0 type will still bid randomly, Lk (k > 0) types will now bid 50 + 15m, where 50
is the expected bonus payment (mean of the random variable) andm is the expected probability
of winning the second p-beauty contest game prize.
38The ticket transaction price in the two RAND treatment sessions are 50 and 51.
19
behavioural anomalies.
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APPENDIX
A. INSTRUCTIONS
Remark: Below is the translated version of the instructions (the instructions were
written in Mandarin). Where necessary, we use “text” and “text" to distinguish
between the instructions for the AVG andAVGINV, respectively. To avoid confus-
ing the subjects, the instructions for Part II (stage 2) do not mention the strategy
method. In the experiment, subjects first submitted their bids. Thereafter, they
were asked to submit their p-beauty contest number if they purchased a ticket.
Finally, subjects were informed about the beliefs elicitation payment (e.g., their
beliefs about the bonus) at the end of part II.
A.1. GENERAL INFORMATION
Thank you for participating in this study. Please note that you are not allowed to
talk with other participants during the study. If you have a question, please raise
your hand and we will answer your question in private. In order to minimize
distractions, please turn off your mobile phone and put away anything else that
could distract you from the study, e.g. books, study notes or electronic devices.
You are only allowed to use the functions of the computer pertained to the current
study. Note that violation of these rulesmay lead to an immediate exclusion from
the study and from all payments. At no time during this study will you learn the
identity of the other participants and no other participants will learn anything
about your identity. Also, no other participant will learn what you earn during
the study: At the end of the study, the amount of money you have earned will be
paid out to you in private. Hence, no other participant will know your choices
and how much money you earn in this study. The experiment will consist of
two parts (Part I and Part II). Your earnings in this experiment will depend on
your decisions in Parts I and II. During the study, we do not speak of RMB, but
in points. Your entire earnings will be calculated in points. At the end of the
study the total amount of points you have earned will be converted to RMB at the
following rate:
1 point = 0.45 RMB
Please read the instructions carefully, because your earnings in the study depends
on how well you understand the instructions. If you follow the instructions and
apply them carefully, you can earn some money in additional to the 10 RMB
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show-up fee which we will give you in any case. Therefore, your total earning in
today’s study is:
Total Earning = Show-up Fee +Money Earned in Part I + Money Earned in Part II
In the following, we present the instructions for Part I of the experiment. The
Part II instructions will be available at the end of Part I.
A.2. INSTRUCTION PART I
There are 24 participants in this room. You will be randomly matched with 7
other participants to form a group and play the Number-Game. There are 8
participants per group.
How the Number-Game works? Each participant chooses a number between
0 and 100 (including both 0 and 100; up to two decimal places). After everyone
has chosen a number, we will compute a “Target-Number". The Target Number
is calculated as follows:
1. We first calculate the group average, which is the average of all 8 numbers
chosen by the participants in your group.
2. Next, we multiply the group average by 2/3 to get the target number
Target Number = 2/3 * Group Average
Thewinner in your group is the participant whose chosen number is closest
to the target number.
The winner will receive a prize of 15 points. In the case of a tie (i.e., where there
are more than one winners), the prize money will be equally split between all
winners.
Some important points: It is important to note that you will never learn the
identity of other group members and others will never know the identity of
you. Also, all participants choose their numbers simultaneously. This means
when you are making your decision, you do not know the number chosen by
other group members. Similarly, when other group members are making their
decisions, they also do not know the number chosen by you.
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A.2.1. Control questions to part I
1. How many participants are there in each group?
2. Do you and your group members choose the number simultaneously? In
other words, do you know each other’s chosen number when you making
decisions? (True/False)
3. The target number is computed by the group average multiplied by 2/3.
(True/false)
4. The participant whose number is closest to the target number will win the
prize. (True/False).
5. Suppose the numbers chosen by one group are: 10, 20, 30, 30, 50, 60, 80,
100:
• What is the group average?
• What is the Target Number?
• Which number wins the game?
• How many points the winners get?
A.3. INSTRUCTION PART II
In part II of the experiment, there are 8 tickets to be sold. Participantswho bought
a ticket will receive a payment of X points for sure (we call this the Redemption-
Amount). In addition, each ticket holder is allowed to participate in another
round of the Number-Game and hence have a chance win a bonus of 15 points.
In the following, we will first explain how the tickets are sold. Thereafter, we will
explain the Redemption-Amount. Finally, we again briefly explain the number
game.
A.3.1. How are tickets sold
There are 24 participants in this experiment and only 8 tickets to be sold. To
determine who gets a ticket, each participant will be endowed with 100 points
and submits a “bid".
• Bid = the maximum amount you are willing to pay for a ticket
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After all participants have submitted their bid, we will rank all 24 bids and sell
the eight tickets to the participants with the highest 8 bids. However, the ticket
holders only need to pay the ninth highest price. This means that if your bid is
amongst the eight highest bids, you will never pay more than your bid amount
and can possibly pay less than your bid amount.
Here is a simple example to help you better understand how the tickets are
sold. Here, there are 24 participants (A-X). Each participant submits a bid and
we rank the bids.
In Example 1, participants Q, R, S, T, U, V, W and X will get to buy a ticket.
However, they each will only pay the 9th highest price, which is 12 points.
EXAMPLE 1.
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X
Bid 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 9 9 10 10 11 11 12 13 14 15 15 17 18 18 19
Rank 9 8 7 5 5 4 2 2 1
Buy
ticket
X X X X X X X X
There can also be situations where participants submit the same bid price. In
example 2, participants S, T, U, V, W and X will get to buy a ticket since they are
the 6 highest bids. However, there is a tie between participants P, Q and R for the
7th and 8th highest bids. In this case, we randomly pick two participants to buy
the ticket – participants P and R in the example. All participants who get to buy
a ticket will only pay 12 points.
EXAMPLE 2.
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X
Bid 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 9 9 10 10 11 11 12 12 12 15 15 17 18 18 19
Rank 7 7 7 5 5 4 2 2 1
Buy
ticket
X X X X X X X X
A.3.2. How the Redemption-Amount is computed
If you purchased a ticket, your ticket will be redeemed at an amount which
we call the Redemption-Amount. Again, you can think about the redemption-
amount as the price which we buy back the ticket from you at. Recall that there
were 24 participants who submitted their chosen number to the Number-Game
in Part I of the Experiment. This results in a total of 24 chosen numbers. To
determine Redemption-Amount, we will first randomly pick eight numbers from
the 24 chosen numbers in part I. Thereafter, we will compute the average of the 8
randomly chosen numbers. The Redemption-Amount is computed as follows:
Redemption-Amount = (Average of the 8 randomly chosen number)
Redemption-Amount = 100- (Average of the 8 randomly chosen number)
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Note that you will only learn about the Redemption-Amount at the end of the
experiment. This means that when you submit your bid, you do not know the
redemption-Amount.
Remark: For the RAND treatment, we omit the text in red. Subjects were
informed that the Redemption-Amount is a random number between 0 and 100.
A.3.3. Playing the Number-Game
If you purchased a ticket, you can participate in theNumber-Game. TheNumber-
Game is exactly like the description in Part I. Briefly, 8 participants each choose a
number between 0 and 100. Given the chosen numbers in the Number-Game, we
calculate a Target-Number which is 2/3 of the average of all 8 chosen numbers
in the Number-Game. The participants whose chosen number is closest to the
Target-Number receives a prize of 15 points. In the case of a tie, the prize money
will be equally split between all winners.
A.3.4. Payoﬀ in Part II
Your payoff in Part II will depend on (a) Whether you purchased a ticket, (b)
The Redemption-Amount if you purchased a ticket and (c) The Number-Game
winner if you purchased a ticket. If you did not purchase a ticket, your payoff is
simply your endowment
Payoff = 100 points
If you purchased a ticket and is a winner in the Number-Game, your payoff is:
Payoff = 100 - (Ticket Price) + (Redemption-Amount) + (15) points
If you purchased a ticket and is NOT a winner in the Number-Game, your payoff
is:
Payoff = 100 - (Ticket Price) + (Redemption-Amount)
A.3.5. Control questions to part II
1. Will everyone be able to get a ticket? (Yes/No)
2. How many tickets will be sold?
3. What is the amount of the lowest bid that you can make?
4. What is the amount of the highest bid that you can make?
5. If you purchase a ticket, will the ticket price ever be higher than your bid?
(True/False)
6. If you purchase a ticket, can it be possible for the ticket price to be lower
than your bid? (True/False)
7. Will you be informed about the Redemption Amount before you purchase
your ticket?
8. Suppose the eight randomly selected numbers from the 24 numbers in part
I are 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80.
• What is the Redemption Amount?
• Suppose you bought the ticket with a cost of 40 50 points and win the
second Number game, how many points do you earn in part II?
• Suppose you bought the ticket with a cost of 40 50 points and do not
win the second Number game, how many points do you earn in part
II?
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B. SUMMARY STATISTICS
Panels A and B of Table B1 detail the summary statistics of BCG1 and BGC2
numbers, respectively, in the AVG, AVGINV and RAND treatments. Each cell
reports the summary statistics for all subjects, followed by auctionwinners (circle
brackets) and auction losers (square brackets). As expected, we do not find
any significant between-treatment differences in BCG1 (Kruskal-wallis (KW),
P  0.71) and BCG2 (KW, P  0.49). We see that choices in the p-beauty contest
game are clearly different from the equilibrium – only a small proportion of
subjects choose 0 or numbers below 10.
Table B1.
Summary statistics.
Treatment AVG AVGINV RAND
♯ of subjects 72 (24) [48] 72 (24) [48] 48 (16) [32]
Panel A: BCG1 numbers.
Median BCG1 number 26 (35) [25] 28 (25) [32] 25 (25) [27]
Frac. BCG1  0 1% (0%) [2%] 6% (12%) [2%] 2% (0%) [3%]
Frac. BCG1 ≤ 5 6% (0%) [6%] 7% (12%) [4%] 4% (0%) [6%]
Frac. BCG1 ≤ 10 6% (0%) [10%] 8% (16%) [4%] 6% (0%) [9%]
Panel B: BCG2 numbers.
Median BCG2 number 26 (34) [21] 25 (20) [31] 25 (25) [25]
Frac. BCG2  0 2% (0%) [2%] 6% (13%) [2%] 4% (0%) [6%]
Frac. BCG2 ≤ 5 7% (0%) [10%] 6% (13%) [2%] 4% (0%) [6%]
Frac. BCG2 ≤ 10 11% (0%) [17%] 8% (16%) [4%] 14% (6%) [18%]
Panel C: Cognitive Reflective test scorei.
Mean 2.68 (2.42) [2.81] 2.61 (2.62) [2.60] 2.83 (2.75) [2.88]
Panel D: Risk preferenceii.
Mean 5.57 (5.62) [5.54] 5.62 (5.48) [2.60] 5.79 (6.25) [5.56]
Panel E: Subjects ∆  BCG1 − BCG2.
Median ∆ 0.05 (0.00) [0.12] 0.00 (2.89) [0.00] 0.00 (0.00) [0.25]
Frac. |∆|  0 18% (16%) [18%] 28% (13%) [35%] 27% (31%) [25%]
Frac. |∆| ≤ 5 58% (33%) [70%] 61% (58%) [64%] 83% (31%) [81%]
Frac. |∆| ≤ 10 80% (70%) [85%] 80% (80%) [80%] 93% (100%) [90%]
Note. Each cell details the summary statistics for all subjects, followed by the auction
winners (circle brackets) and auction losers (square brackets).
i Maximum score is 3.
ii Risk preference is a scale from 1-12. The risk-neutral scale is XX.
Panels C and D of Table B1 detail the mean cognitive reflective test (KS,
P  0.28) performances and elicited risk preferences (KW, P  0.55) – we again do
not find any significant between-treatment differences. There does not seem to be
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any notable within-treatment differences in cognitive reflective test performances
and risk preferences amongst auctionwinners and losers.39 Wenote that subjects’
cognitive reflective test performances in all treatments seem to be somewhat
high compared to the literature.40 We cannot exclude the possibility that the
subject pool might have prior exposure to the cognitive reflective test in previous
experiments or classes.
Finally, Panel E of Table B1 details the median ∆  BCG1 − BCG2 in the
all treatments as well as the proportion of subjects who absolute value of ∆ is
0, at most 5 and at most 10. We do not find any significant between-treatment
differences in ∆ (KW, P  0.89). Furthermore, within-treatment comparison does
not find ∆ to differ significantly amongst auction winners and losers (Mann-
whitney, P ≥ 0.18 in all treatments).
39Only in the AVG treatment do we find the cognitive reflective test performances to be signifi-
cantly lower for auction winners relative to losers (Mann-Whitney, P  0.02).
40In general, the literature finds that mean performances between 1.5-2.
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